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Abstract                                                                                                                                                                           
This paper investigates the impact of bank recapitalization on the risk taking attitude of commercial banks in Nigeria. 
We employed panel data model in the analyses and the results show that increase in bank capital promotes bank 
stability. The results also reveal that excessive provisions for bad loans may be an indication that a large part of bank 
credit is nonperforming and this affects bank’s stability adversely. The results further indicate that growth in size is 
an important determinant of credit risk alongside large capital, although growth in size of banks has a nonlinear 
effect on bank stability. We found that the consolidation period was followed by abnormal increases in bank lending, 
indicating the existence of moral hazard problem.  Our findings suggest that increase in capital base should also be 
matched with effective regulations to prevent moral hazard problem from dampening the positive effect of capital 
reforms on bank stability. 
Keywords: recapitalisation, merger, consolidation, reforms, risk-taking 
  
1.0.            Introduction 
The Nigerian banking industry has passed through different phases of reforms since the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the country in 1986, at least to make the industry compatible with 
international standards and to ensure financial stability. The first phase of reform in the industry was the financial 
systems reforms of 1986 to 1993 which led to deregulation of the banking industry which was before then dominated 
by indigenous ownership with over 60 per cent Federal and State governments’ stakes.  Credit, interest rate and 
foreign exchange policy reforms were also part of the reforms in this phase. The massive bank failures of 1993 let to 
the second phase of reforms which covers the period 1993-1998. The third phase began with the return to civilian 
rule in 1999 which reintroduced liberalization of the financial sectors, accompanied with the adoption of distress 
resolution programmes. This era also saw the introduction of universal banking which empowered the banks to 
operate in all aspect of retail banking and non-bank financial markets. The fourth phase is the consolidation which 
began in 2004 (called the big bang) to date and it is informed by the Nigerian monetary authorities who asserted that 
the financial system was characterized by structural and operational weaknesses and that their catalytic role in 
promoting private sector led growth could be further enhanced through a more pragmatic reform (Balogun, 2007). 
In terms of performance, the banking industry in Nigeria witnessed a remarkable growth, especially since 
the de-regulation of the financial services sector in the last quarter of 1986. For example, the number of banks 
increased by about 154.8% from 42 in 1986 to 107 in 1990. It further increased by about 12% to120 in 1992. By 
2004, however, the number had reduced to 89 as many banks that could not cope with the increasing competition for 
funds and increasing cost of operation had to liquidate. The number of bank branches also rose from 1,394 in 1986 to 
2,013 in 1990, 2,391 in1992 and by 2004 in spite of the reduction in number of banks, it had reached 3,100. This 
translates to inter-temporal increases of 44%, 18.8 percent and 29.7 percent, respectively (CBN, 2005; Ebong, 2007). 
Also, banks deposit mobilization between 1990 and 2004 increased drastically. For example, total deposits in the 
banking industry increased by 3,687.3 percent from N43.87 billion in 1990 to N1,661.5 billion in 2004. Due to the 
structure of the industry, however, the bulk of these deposits was held by a few banks. For instance, of the eighty-
nine banks in existence in 2004, only ten accounted for 55.3 percent and 55.4 percent of the total deposits in 2003 
and 2004, respectively (CBN, 2005). The rate of growth of aggregate bank credit (net) to the domestic economy 
ranged from 13.5 percent in 1997 to 60.1 percent in 1999. This declined to a low of 22 percent in 2004 and rose 
again to 30 percent in 2004 during the consolidation period. 
Due to the lending habit of banks in the 1990s and early 2000s, it was found that the asset quality 
deteriorated progressively at the beginning of 2000. According to CBN(2005) the ratio of non-performing credit to 
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total credit declined from 45 percent in 1992 to 19.35 percent in 1998, and by 2000, the ratio of nonperforming to 
total loans rose to 21.5 percent and again to 23.08 percent in 2004. These bad accounts represented 567.7%, 419.8% 
and 105.3% of shareholders’ funds in 1994, 1996 and 2004, respectively. Indeed, in the years 1990 to 1997, the 
shareholders’ funds had been impaired by non-performing risk assets in several multiples. The banks adjudged to be 
sound was consistently less than 15% of the total number for the four-year period. In addition, those whose 
performance was considered satisfactory represented as high as 70% of the total in 2001. By 2004, however, this 
group represented only 58.6% of the total number of banks covered by the exercise (CBN, 2005). 
1.2. Research Problem 
 In response to the continuing deterioration in the financial health of the banking industry in Nigeria and in 
order to ensure a reliable and sound banking system, the CBN in July, 2004 rolled out a 13 point reform agenda 
aimed at consolidating the banking sector and preventing the occurrence of systemic distress. Two major elements in 
the reform package were the requirement that the minimum capitalization[1] for banks should be N25 billion with 
effect from end of December, 2005 and the consolidation of banking institutions through mergers and acquisitions 
should be initiated. The exercise resulted in 25 banks through mergers, acquisitions and equity finance after the 
revocation of the banking licenses to 14 banks which as at 31st December 2005 had failed to meet the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement of N25 billion. 
The 2004 banking reform was not the first time banks in Nigeria were required to recapitalize. For example 
prior to 1992, the minimum paid up capital requirement for banks in Nigeria was N12 million for merchant banks 
and N20 million for commercial banks. A review that year moved the requirements to N40 million and N50 million 
respectively. This level lasted till 1997 when a uniform N500 million minimum capital was introduced. In 2000, the 
minimum capital was moved to N1 billion for new banks while existing banks were expected to meet this level by 
December 2002. N2 billion minimum paid up capital was introduced for new banks in 2001 while existing banks 
were given until December 2004 to comply. Unfortunately however, the upward review of minimum capital base to 
N50 million in 1992 and again to N500 million in 1997 or to N1 billion in 2000, could not prevent systemic distress 
that plagued the industry between 1993 and 2002 during which 51 banks were distressed in 1995, and 22 others in 
1998. Moreover, five banks were liquidated between 1994 and 1995, and 26 others in 1998 (CBN, 2000). In 2002, 
five more commercial banks were liquidated.  This trend suggests that adjusting or raising the minimum capital base 
of banks has not guaranteed a stable banking industry in Nigeria and it is not known whether raising the capital base 
of banks increases or decreases their risk taking incentives. 
Following the 2005 consolidation, there have been some worrisome developments in the banking sector. 
For example, total credit of the banking sector recorded a growth rate of 23.83 percent in 2004, 30.36 percent in 
2005, 40.89 percent in 2006, 82.7 percent in 2007 and 62.82 percent in 2008. Non-performing credits increased from 
N0.4 trillion in 2007 to N0.5 trillion in 2008, although there were improvements in the ratio of non-performing 
credits to total credits. These ratios were 21.8 percent, 18.12 percent, 8.77 percent, 8.44 percent and 6.26 percent in 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. The provision for bad and doubtful debts grew from N0.2 trillion in 
2004 to N0.4 trillion in 2008. The ratio of bad debts provision to total credit declined from 22.6 percent in 2004 to 
6.1 percent in 2008. Earnings volatility, rising non-performing credits, declining ratio of provision for bad and 
doubtful debts and increases in off-balance sheet activities such as lending money to customers to purchase shares in 
the stock market as well as bursting of the bubble in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were indications of increasing 
risks observed in the banking industry in Nigeria in the post consolidation period (CBN, 2008) 
               This study is therefore motivated by some important issues in the literature. The first is that few empirical 
works (see Murinde and Zhao, 2009) have investigated the effect of minimum capital regulation and mergers on 
bank risk-taking behavior in Nigeria following the recent consolidation exercise. Our study will depart from Murinde 
and Zhao paper in different ways. First, the measure of risk adopted. While they use loan loss provision as a measure 
of bank risk we use the z-score and other measures of bank risk such as volatility of returns and loan growth. 
Adopting alternative measures of risk in the study will shield more light on how capital structure is related to 
alternative measures of bank risk. Also, the advantage of z-score measure over the loan loss provision, which 
existing literature has pointed out is that the z-score measures the number of standard deviations by which bank 
returns have to fall to wipe out bank equity (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). It can also be used to measure systemic risk by 
computing system wide z-score. This indicator has been widely used in recent analyses due to its suggestive 
distance-to-insolvency interpretation (Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, 2010; and Laeven and Levine, 2008; 
among others). 
The second motivation for this study is that the disagreements in the theoretical banking literature on the 
effect of minimum capital regulation and mergers on bank risk taking behaviour require empirical investigation using 
country specific datasets. Our study would therefore attempt to fill the above gaps in the Nigerian domestic literature 
by addressing the following research questions: How does recapitalization and mergers affect risk taking behavior of 
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Nigerian commercial banks? And Are there other bank specific factors other than capital that affect risk-taking 
behavior of commercial banks in Nigeria? 
2.0.            Methodology and Data 
2.1.1.       Conceptual Issues 
Risk measure: we adopted various measures of bank risk in the study. One is the Z score measure of bank level risk 
adopted by Laeven and Levine (2008) defined as sum of return on assets plus capital-asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of asset returns. That is , and this is the inverse of the probability of insolvency. ROA is return on 
assets defined as π/A where π is net profit and A is total assets, and CAR is the capital-asset ratio defined as E/A, 
where E is shareholders equity. According Laeven and Levine, the Z score indicates the number of standard 
deviations that a bank’s ROA has to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted. This is used as a 
composite measure of bank stability. A higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable. Since the z-score is 
highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of z-score (which is normally distributed) in our estimations.  Besides 
studying the z-score which is a composite measure of risk, we separately examined alternative measures of bank risk 
such as volatility of asset returns, , and leverage, , volatility of equity returns and volatility of earnings. Volatility of 
earnings equals the standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan provisions to average total 
assets, while volatility of equity returns is the annualized value of volatility of weekly equity returns for each year 
(Laeven and Levine, 2008). Other measures of risk that have been used in the banking literature which we adopt 
includes credit growth which captures credit risk and liquidity risk which is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and 
short-term funds. One reason why we adopt this approach to bank risk analysis is that over the years Nigerian 
banking industry has witnessed a high wave of instability even after the bank consolidation exercise of 2005. One 
measure of bank risk may not be sufficient to obtain a comprehensive analysis for good policy prescriptions. 
Bank Level control variables:  in order to control for bank level heterogeneity, have shall introduce a set of control 
variables both time variant and time invariant represented in our model by the vector . These are as defined below. 
Log of total assets (LOGASSET) measures the size of the bank. Banks in Nigeria have grown in size measured by 
the total assets. Most banks now use their assets as advertising technique to gain customers from their rivals. This has 
been adopted in many studies to control for the effect of size on bank performance as well as on bank risk taking 
behavior (Naceur, 2003; Clarke et al., 2004). The relative efficiency hypothesis presupposes that larger banks are 
more efficient than smaller ones, and are more profitable as a result of this superior efficiency. Larger banks have 
better risk diversification opportunities and thus lower cost of funding than smaller ones. We have no apriori 
assumption on the sign of coefficient of assets (as a measure of bank size) on bank stability. This sign of the 
coefficient will depend on asset quality, loan portfolio, and probability the measure of risk adopted. If the banks have 
high quality assets, we expect this to increase bank stability. 
largebank (MKTSHARE) is a variable that measures the percentage of total deposits of the banking industry 
controlled by a bank i at time t. A bank that has 10 percent or more of the market share is considered a large bank 
(Laeven and Levine, 2008). We shall use the growth of deposits to measure public confidence in bank i at time t. 
However, due to asymmetric information, deposit growth in Nigeria may not actually be due to the fact that the bank 
takes minimal risk. This might be caused by marketing approach and deposit drives by banks and extensive 
advertising which are likely to misinform depositors. 
Merger takes the value one if bank consolidated by merger and zero otherwise. The effect of merger on bank risk 
taking is ambiguous and depends on similarity and dissimilarity of risk taking behavior of merging banks D’Souza 
and Lai (2006). 
Loanprov is the ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Total Loans and captures the amount of provisions for bad loans 
bank i makes at time t. The sign of this coefficient is ambiguous in the sense that higher loan loss provision than the 
previous year could serve as a buffer or precautionary reserve building as well as a provision for rising amount of 
nonperforming loan. 
Reform_dummy is a reform dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the post-consolidation and zero otherwise. 
These will help to capture structural break due to massive reforms that occurred in the industry since 2004. 
2.1.2.       Model Specification 
               Following the works done by Fraser and Anderson (1999), Laeven and Levine (2008) among others, and 
the nature of our dataset, we shall employ panel data technique in our study in order to account for possible serially 
related component or cross-sectionally related component or both of the disturbance term.  Hence we specify a time-
series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis as follows. 
Where Zit is the risk measure of bank i at time t (log_ z-score, loangrowth, loanprov), Zit-k is the K
th lag of 
risk.  CARit is the capital of bank i at time t, the other variables are  bank-level control variables, y wide variables 
and dummy variables as we defined in table 12 in the appendix    such that   denotes unobservable  bank specific 
effect,  denotes unobservable time effect, and  is the remainder stochastic disturbance. It should be noted that  is 
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bank-invariant and accounts for any time specific effect that is not included in the regression. According to Fraser 
and Anderson (2000), “the TSCS procedure adds the individual and time-specific random effects to the variance-
covariance matrix of the disturbance term. As a result, the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance term is no 
longer a diagonal matrix with the same value at each diagonal element as with OLS, but a full matrix in which each 
element can assume a unique value. 
We apply two different techniques to estimate the model: Pooled Ordinary least squares (POLS) estimator 
and a dynamic two-step system GMM panel estimator, as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer’s 
(2005) finite sample correction. Since panel is unbalanced and given the autoregressive regression model, we use the 
orthogonal deviations transformation of instruments, which makes them also exogenous to possible bank-level fixed 
effects. Standard errors are robust regarding potential problems from heteroskedasticity and clustering of 
observations within banks using the Huber-White correction in the OLS specification, and using the Windmeijer 
correction in our GMM models. By adopting a panel and dynamic panel analysis, we would be able to capture most 
of the dynamics that underlie adjustments in capital structure of banks both before and after the 2004/2005 “big 
bang.” In order to investigate if bank capital has a non-linear effect on risk-taking behavior we shall introduce the 
square of capital as one of the regressors. 
2.1.3.       Data 
Data for the analysis are bank level panel data covering all 25 consolidated banks in Nigeria for the period 
2001 to 2008. Data sourcesl include CBN Annual Report on Bank Supervision and Performance, banks’ annual 
reports and financial statements various years, among others. The challenge of gathering bank level data in Nigeria is 
very enormous considering the fact that banks do not adopt uniform standards in reporting their final accounts in 
Nigeria. However, we were able to gather substantial information from the annual reports published by the banks and 
also the Banking Supervision report published by the central bank of Nigeria each year. We were able to obtain most 
of the bank reports from the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission Abuja as well as from bank 
headquarters. From the data collected from these sources we calculated other measures such as the z-score, loan 
growth, volatility of earnings and Capital to Asset Ratio (CAR). 
3.0.           Empirical Results, Discussions and the Policy Implications 
The following section shows the empirical results as well as our interpretation of the results and their policy 
implications. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the model estimations. The merger 
variable shows that about 37 percent of the banks that emerged after the consolidation occurred through mergers, 
while the remaining 63 percent acquired other banks.  We consider banks that have more than 10 percent of the total 
industry deposit at any time large banks and about 48 percent of the sample consists of large banks since they 
account, on the aggregate, for largest concentration of banking industry’s deposits. The reform dummy captures the 
period after the consolidation of 2004. The dummy takes the value 0 for periods before 2004 and takes the value 1 
otherwise. Hence about 50 percent of the sample period was collected in the post 2004 consolidation. The mean of 
capital adequacy ratio was 15 percent for the industry over the entire sample period although the lowest over the 
sample was 2.3 percent implying severe undercapitalization and the peak of 41 percent implying capital adequacy. 
The average return on assets was 2.2 percent although it was lowest at 0.6 percent at some point in the sample and 
the peak was as high as 38 percent, this was not generally bank for the industry in terms of performance. 
The average  total assets for the banking industry was N210.53 billion with the peak of N1.68 trillion for 
some bank at some point in the sample. The deposit accumulation follows almost the same course as total assets 
although assets are slightly higher on the average. For example, the deposit for the industry as a whole reached a 
peak of N1.26 trillion.  Both have been used interchangeably by empirical studies to measure the size of individual 
banks. However, the volatility of deposits is higher than that of assets. In our estimations, both of them produced 
identical results. The logarithm of z-score is used instead of standard z-score because the log is approximately 
normally distributed and the average z-score over the sample period is about 2.7. The average loans and advances 
over the sample period was N67.6 billion this reached a peak of N447.1 billion. Share of provision for bad and 
doubtful loans to total loans (loanprov) reached a high of 47 percent and on the average was 11 percent over the 
study period and most of the increase occurred after the consolidation of 2004 and 2005. Loan growth over the study 
period was 31 percent on the average and it reached all-time high of about 85 percent after the consolidation. This, 
combined with increasing provision for bad loans, shows that a substantial proportion of the loans were expected to 
be nonperforming, an indication of increasing risk-taking by commercial banks in Nigeria following the 
recapitalization exercise. 
Table 2 shows the pooled OLS estimates of determinants of bank risk using z-score (aggregate risk) and 
loan growth (proxy for credit risk). Pooled OLS estimator is appropriate since Hausman’s test suggests random effect 
model is preferred over fixed effect estimator. Table 3 shows similar results but with Hausman-Taylor estimator 
which is an instrumental variable (IV) estimator that additionally enables the coefficients of time invariant regressors 
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to be estimated. It does so by making the stronger assumption that some specified regressors are uncorrelated with 
the fixed effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The Pooled OLS estimates and Hausman-Taylor results show positive 
and statistically significant impact of bank capital (CAR) on bank stability (z-score). For example a unit increase in 
CAR increases bank z-score by two standard deviations. In other words, increase in capital adequacy ratio reduced 
significantly the probability of bankruptcy among commercial banks in Nigeria. The OLS results show that increase 
in CAR has positive impact on loan growth but this is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This 
suggests that the recapitalisation increased moral hazard problem because it caused banks to lend more and the 
possible adverse selection effect caused nonperforming loans to increase, hence commercial banks were exposed to 
high credit risk. 
The reform dummy variable shows that there was structural break in 2004 in bank risk model following the 
bank consolidation. The dummy shows negative impact of the post-consolidation on bank stability which was 
contrary to expectations. This result is consistent with the events that unfolded after the consolidation in which banks 
were bailed out and are being forced to merge and some of them taken over by the monetary authorities. The results, 
on the other hand, show positive and significant impact of the consolidation on credit growth. There was substantial 
credit growth and increase in margin lending by commercial banks in Nigeria following the consolidation exercise. 
This was due to moral hazard problem created by large capital. It was through this channel that the consolidation 
period led to lower z-score or increase in the probability of insolvency. The lagged z-score has positive and 
significant impact on the current z-score which implies that capital buffers built up in the past increases bank 
stability in the subsequent periods. 
The variable merger has positive effect on bank z-score and significant negative impact on bank credit 
growth suggesting that weeding out of weaker banks in the system is consistent with bank stability. This is because 
merged banks are more cautious with lending and with large capital are better able to deal with short-term liquidity 
problems than the smaller banks. The results show that earnings volatility, that is, the volatility of ROA has 
significant negative impact on bank z-score or bank stability. The loan growth model shows that size matters and has 
significant nonlinear effect on bank credit risk. The quadratic pattern shows a minimum which means as banks 
become larger credit risk reduces until at the turning point when increase in size (deposits) increases credit risks. 
Table 4 shows Arellano-Bond dynamic two-step system GMM panel estimates with Windmeijer’s finite 
sample correction. The table shows the results for zscore measure of aggregate bank risk and the results for 
alternative measures of bank risk we adopted in this study namely, loan growth (loangrowth), and in table 10 we 
show the results for loan loss provision alternative definition of bank risk-taking for robustness checks. The dynamic 
panel model is informed by that fact that previous state of bank stability or bank z-score could have effect on the 
current values or previous level of bank risk taking behaviour could also affect the current level of bank risk having 
observed the consequences over time. In order to account for this dynamics we estimated dynamic panel model using 
the method suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Windmeijer (2005). We reported the dynamic panel 
specification or post-estimation tests on the foot of the results in table 4 and table 5. The statistics show we do not 
have any specification problem. For example, the test of overindentifying restrictions show that the null of validity 
could not be rejected and there is no autocorrelation of the residuals at the chosen lags as shown by the high 
probability values in parentheses. 
The results in table 4 show that there is significant persistence as exhibited by the significance of the lags of 
the logarithm of z-score up to the third lag. The previous z-scores up to lag 3 have significant positive effect on the 
current z-score implying that capital buffers built up in the past have a long lasting effect on the current level of bank 
stability. Similar results are seen with loan growth variable as proxy for bank credit risk. In column 3 of table 4, we 
see a significant negative impact of previous values of loan growth on the current value up to lag 2. This implies that 
banks became more cautious with lending having been exposed to substantial credit risk after the consolidation. They 
learnt from experience although regulatory factors may have contributed partly to cautious lending by commercial 
banks. 
Corroborating OLS results, the dynamic panel results in table 4 show that capital adequacy has strong 
positive impact on bank stability measured by the z-score and on the other hand, has significant positive impact on 
credit growth. In other words, large capital is central to achieving a stable banking industry in Nigeria if commercial 
banks could manage the moral hazard problem resulting therefrom. We found that merger has positive and 
significant impact on bank stability. It reduces the probability of bankruptcy as merged banks become more efficient 
with large capital and with more diversified management. Merging of banks has negative impact on credit growth 
thus reducing the probability of incurring large amounts of nonperforming loans. The reform dummy has negative 
and significant impact on bank z-score and at the same time has positive and significant impact on loan growth. This 
means that as banks became more consolidated with large capital they increased margin lending due to moral hazard 
problem. Eventually, most of these loans turned bad and exposed the banks to substantial amount of credit risk and 
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hence increases the probability of bankruptcy. Thus large amount of capital could be a double-edge sword if not 
supported by effective regulation to control the lending pattern of commercial banks. 
Consistent with OLS estimates and some theoretical literature, the dynamic panel estimates show a 
significant nonlinear effect of size (measured by either total assets or total deposits) on credit growth. This is shown 
by the significance of both the log of total assets (or total deposits) and the squared log of total assets and total 
deposits. This implies that increase in size reduces risk up to a point and then increases risk taking. Again, we see a 
strong negative impact of volatility of asset returns (ROA) on bank stability. This means that banks with more 
variable earnings are more likely to be unstable and sooner or later may be weeded out of the industry. 
The result for loan growth model shows a significant negative impact of loan loss provisions on credit growth. This 
is expected because as banks make higher provisions for bad loans, the less the amount they would lend and hence 
the lower the amount of debts that will turn bad in the subsequent periods. Therefore, large provision for bad loans is 
desirable as it reduces banks’ exposure to credit risk but less desirable because it reduces earnings and thus decreases 
bank stability. 
Table 5 shows the results for ratio of loan loss provision to total loans as alternative measure of bank risk. 
The results are similar to the results with obtained using the loan growth as a measure of credit risk in table 9. The 
results show that CAR has positive and significant impact on loan loss provision. Hence CAR increases bank 
appetite for increase in lending as well as increase in provision for losses, other things being equal. Merger of banks 
in Nigeria was characterised by significantly higher provisions for loan losses. This might due to the fact that merged 
banks became very cautious by making excessive provisions or became reckless with lending thereby increasing 
provision for losses. The reform dummy has negative and significant impact on loan loss provisions while increase in 
size (total assets) has significant positive impact on loan loss provisions but this effect is nonlinear due to the 
negative and significant impact of the coefficient of log of total assets in the regression. The positive and nonlinear 
impact of size on risk means that as banks growth larger in size they become reckless depending on whether 
increasing provision for losses could be interpreted as increasing risk. But at a certain size the bank reduces margin 
loans and hence decreases provision for losses. The asset structure variable shows positive and significant impact on 
loan loss provisions which means that the potential to make larger profits by lending more out of the total assets 
exposes the bank significantly to credit risk. 
3.1.            Policy Implications of the Results and Conclusion 
Our results have important policy implications on how to ensure safe and stable commercial banking 
industry in Nigeria. First, capital adequacy matters and thus is fundamental to ensuring the stability of the banking 
industry in Nigeria. Again, the merging of banks to create large banks was very fundamental to reducing systemic 
distress in the Nigerian banking industry. Hence bank recapitalization exercise through mergers and acquisitions in 
the country was a step in the right direction towards achieving a stable financial environment and should be pursued 
with rigor. Therefore capital-based reforms should also be matched with effective regulations to prevent moral 
hazard problem from dampening the positive effect of capital on bank stability.  Second and important policy 
implication of our findings is that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should closely monitor banks that make large 
provisions for bad loans because this might be an indication of potential high degree of non-performing loans instead 
of serving as a cushion for absorbing the risk of bankruptcy. Increasing provision for loan losses might serve as early 
warning signal of impending credit risk crisis. If such excessive provisions are not monitored on time, they are likely 
to increase the probability of bankruptcy in the future. This was the main reason why about five banks were at the 
brink of collapse before the CBN intervened with bank bail-out with over N420 billion (about $280 million). The 
CBN failed to effectively supervise banks pattern of lending and scrutinize the provision for bad loans properly 
immediately after the 2004/2005 bank consolidation. 
The third policy implication of our results is that banks learn overtime and as a result of high risk exposure 
in the past. This was evident in the significant negative impacts of the previous risk on the current level of risks. By 
incurring huge loses banks are likely to reposition themselves in subsequent periods. This will be the case if the 
regulatory authorities impose adequate checks and penalties for contraventions of the frameworks within which 
banks should operate. Moreover, the significant positive values of the lagged z-scores on the current z-score means 
that a stable banking industry has a lasting effect on the future stability of the industry but this is not likely to last 
forever. Therefore regulatory and operational environment of the industry should be reviewed at all times to suite the 
macroeconomic environment. The fourth policy implication of our findings is that growth in size is likely to result in 
inefficiencies unless there is expansion of managerial and regulatory capacity to deal with the complexities of 
managing such large financial institutions. Again, correct valuation of banks’ assets at all times especially with 
respect to risky nature of the assets will be necessary to avoid overblowing assets. 
 Finally, the post-consolidation period is characterized by increase in risk-taking by banks and thus has 
negative impact on bank stability. Hence, the recapitalization process introduced moral hazard problems in the 
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banking industry. Therefore deposit insurance should be adequately priced to reduce moral hazard problems and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria needs to increase its surveillance and monitoring of banks operations to be able to detect 
early warning signals of possible future crisis and take steps to mitigate them without sending negative messages to 
depositors. 
3.2.            Conclusion 
The 2004 bank reforms in Nigeria with major emphasis on recapitalization and bank mergers as a way of 
consolidating the banking industry was a step in the right direction towards achieving a stable and sustainable 
financial services industry that meets global standards. Our findings suggest that capital adequacy plays a crucial role 
in the stability of the banking industry as a whole. However, it does have other problems associated with such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems which may lead to excessive and reckless lending respectively. 
Therefore, banks should be strictly monitored and they should adopt uniform format for presenting the financial 
statements and thus be compelled by law to display important information to shareholders and depositors in order to 
minimize adverse selection problems. There is still room for more research into this area as data have started 
emerging in the post-consolidation period. The focus of the research should be in the area of moral hazard problems 
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Results Appendix 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Shareholders fund 174 30418.94 50721.73 656 339847 
total assets 174 210527.9 299521.2 2130 1680302 
loans 174 67592.09 91969.48 585 447061 
provision 174 5892.201 7355.234 6 39002 
deposits 174 141462.9 213557.6 237 1258035 
merger 174 0.373563 0.485146 0 1 
large bank 174 0.482759 0.501145 0 1 
reform dummy 174 0.477012 0.500913 0 1 
CAR 174 0.1489 0.072178 0.023258 0.412954 
ROA 174 0.03954 0.040719 -0.1216 0.421155 
std_ROA 174 0.021549 0.03451 9.38E-05 0.381615 
log_totasset 174 11.42782 1.335882 7.663877 14.33448 
log_deposit 174 10.88795 1.563169 5.46806 14.04506 
log_zscore 174 2.690091 1.317838 -0.36348 8.146577 
loangrowth 151 31.85497 22.58204 -32.3257 84.98151 
loanprov 174 0.11192 0.094496 0.009639 0.470284 
  
Table 2 Pooled OLS Estimates of Determinants of Bank Risk in Nigeria 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  zscore loangrowth zscore2 loangrowth2 
CAR 2.175*** 19.18+ 1.682** 19.11+ 
  (3.39) (1.81) (2.71) (1.79) 
L.log_prov -0.203* -5.416*** -0.188* -5.407*** 
  (-2.16) (-3.76) (-2.36) (-3.73) 
L.log_zscore 0.303*** 0.256   0.262 
  (4.78) (0.24)   (0.25) 
L.log_totasset 0.122       
  (0.98)       
reform_dummy -0.355 10.49** -0.177 10.37* 
  (-1.09) (2.65) (-0.55) (2.52) 
merger 0.0867   0.116   
  (0.29)   (0.38)   
std_ROA -19.48***   -12.13***   
  (-7.56)   (-4.59)   
L.log_deposit   -15.98***   -15.87*** 
    (-4.93)   (-4.70) 
log_deposit     0.0919   
      (1.09)   
logdepsq   0.881***   0.881*** 
    (6.22)   (6.19) 
log_zscorelag     0.355***   
      (6.30)   
largebank       -0.506 
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        (-0.12) 
_cons 2.334* 123.5*** 3.153*** 122.6*** 
  (2.33) (7.05) (3.84) (6.41) 
N 149 149 149 149 
chi2 88.43 92.16 111.0 91.53 
r2_b 0.693 0.371 0.294 0.371 
r2_w 0.301 0.403 0.467 0.403 
sigma_u 0 4.286 0.367 4.304 
sigma_e 1.067 16.56 0.935 16.56 
rho 0 0.0628 0.134 0.0633 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table 3 Hausman-Taylor Estimates of Determinants of Bank Risk in Nigeria 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  zscore zscore1 loangrowth 
L.log_prov -0.186* -0.218* -8.249*** 
  (-2.14) (-2.01) (-4.32) 
log_zscorelag 0.377***     
  (6.76)     
reform_dummy -0.111 -0.476 10.82** 
  (-0.33) (-1.33) (2.61) 
merger 0.138 0.168   
  (0.43) (0.52)   
CAR 1.526* 2.240*** 22.90* 
  (2.45) (3.47) (2.17) 
std_ROA -10.12*** -19.63***   
  (-3.75) (-7.29)   
log_deposit 0.0440     
  (0.40)     
largebank 0.205 -0.0815 -0.572 
  (0.67) (-0.29) (-0.10) 
L.log_zscore   0.279*** -0.0576 
    (4.30) (-0.05) 
L.log_totasset   0.179   
    (0.99)   
logdepsq     0.922*** 
      (6.42) 
L.log_deposit     -14.38*** 
      (-4.35) 
_cons 3.508*** 1.923 123.3*** 
  (3.52) (1.33) (6.32) 
N 149 149 149 
chi2 109.6 (0.000) 78.11 (0.000) 90.46 (0.000) 
sigma_u 0.497 0.261 9.163 
sigma_e 0.908 1.037 16.16 
rho 0.231 0.0594 0.243 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4 Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Two-step GMM Estimates of Bank Risk in Nigeria 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2stepzscore1 2stepzscore2 2steploangrowth1 2steploangrowth2 
L.log_zscore 0.197** 0.135* 0.830 0.719 
  (2.86) (2.20) (1.05) (0.78) 
L2.log_zscore 0.180*** 0.143***     
  (4.03) (3.53)     
L3.log_zscore 0.0802* 0.0559+     
  (2.29) (1.86)     
L.log_prov 0.156*** 0.176*** -13.54*** -11.70*** 
  (3.39) (3.30) (-5.83) (-3.37) 
reform_dummy -1.592*** -1.244** 0.594 1.552 
  (-4.15) (-3.12) (0.08) (0.27) 
merger 0.842+ 0.756+ -3.344 -6.334 
  (1.79) (1.76) (-0.54) (-1.18) 
std_ROA -56.81*** -54.85***     
  (-9.53) (-10.63)     
CAR 7.134*** 7.260*** 91.49*** 66.95* 
  (8.72) (7.34) (4.18) (2.41) 
log_deposit -0.0177       
  (-0.25)       
log_totasset   -1.523     
    (-1.30)     
logtotassq   0.0599   1.615*** 
    (1.21)   (7.12) 
L.loangrowth     -0.161* -0.111 
      (-2.03) (-1.20) 
L2.loangrowth     -0.303*** -0.176** 
      (-5.90) (-2.70) 
L.log_deposit     -13.11***   
      (-3.80)   
logdepsq     1.441***   
      (8.49)   
L.log_totasset       -22.01** 
        (-2.66) 
_cons 1.048 10.26 92.29*** 145.0** 
  (0.94) (1.42) (3.45) (2.88) 

































.0561  (0.9553) 
  
10.8220 (0.5442) 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5 Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Two-step GMM Estimates of Bank Risk Behaviour 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  loanprov1 loanprov2 loanprovpooled 
L.loanprov 0.443*** 0.628*** 0.769*** 
  (6.93) (14.34) (9.75) 
L2.loanprov -0.0710*** -0.0294 -0.0490 
  (-4.83) (-0.64) (-0.66) 
CAR 0.329*** 0.396*** 0.123+ 
  (13.74) (6.84) (1.85) 
merger 0.0653* 0.0938** 0.0284* 
  (2.30) (2.77) (2.56) 
reform_dummy -0.108*** -0.152*** -0.0557** 
  (-3.67) (-4.02) (-3.13) 
log_totasset 0.283*** 0.435*** 0.218** 
  (4.97) (4.08) (3.05) 
logtotassq -0.0118*** -0.0177*** -0.00914** 
  (-4.95) (-4.11) (-3.08) 
std_ROA   -0.0224 -0.0909 
    (-0.73) (-0.81) 
asset_struct   0.0337** 0.0604*** 
    (3.12) (4.59) 
_cons -1.640*** -2.629*** -1.279** 
  (-4.97) (-4.01) (-3.00) 





























t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
[1] There are several options open to Nigerian banks to meet the stipulated minimum capital base requirement. These include: 
approaching the capital market for funds through an Initial Public Offer (IPO), Private Placement or Rights Issue; through merger 
with like-minded and synergy-producing banks; acquiring another bank or be available for acquisition; and to close shop and 
surrender the banking license (CBN, 2005). 
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